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Abstract 
Biofuels are meant to be an environmental friendly alternative for the use of fossil fuels. This 
idea led to the use of subsidies in order to support their production and use. In the USA, the EPA 
is in charge of establishing mandates to obligated parties and enforcing compliance. Renewable 
Identification Numbers (“RIN”) are generated for every gallon of biofuel produced in or 
imported by the USA. This number is the accounting mechanism with which the obligated party, 
blenders and refiners, can show that their obligation is fulfilled. RINs can only be used for 
compliance after they are separated from their underlying batches of biofuel. The blending of 
this batch or part of this batch of biofuel with gasoline or diesel triggers the separation event. At 
this point, the obligated party that has the separated RIN can use it for compliance, store it 
according to some rules and constraints or sell it to a different party. In the end of each yearly 
period, parties need to send enough RINs to fulfill their individual mandate of each biofuel type. 
A party, therefore, can meet the mandate without physically blending, or blend above the 
mandate and sell their excess RINs. Because some refiners should have lower ethanol sourcing 
costs than others, it is expected that they will be able to trade RINs, therefore decreasing total 
mandate compliance costs. 
Ethanol sourcing costs will be one of the predominant factors in defining which parties will 
blend, which will buy the RINs and the market value of RINs in the future. Furthermore, this 
factor has been neglected in the existing literature on RINs, and the results of this thesis show 
that there is much to understand from a comprehensive analysis of how transportation costs and 
the ethanol supply chain may influence the RINs market.  
   iii 
This thesis analyzes the role of logistics in the ethanol supply chain, comparing outcomes when a 
RINs market exists to a baseline case where RINs are not available. The results are obtained for 
different levels of blending margin, B, which is defined as the price of gasoline, PxGas, minus 
the price of ethanol, PxEth. The findings suggest that, under certain values of B, the existence of 
a RINs market decreases the total amount blended. Total savings from RINs are estimated to be 
up to 50% of the total transportation costs in the ethanol blending sector, or up to $400 million.  
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Introduction 
“If I’m going to do it physical, it’s got to be a good price, the logistics have to work, 
and I’ve got to have some spread to make it worth my time…On the other side, if it’s 
a RIN I’m going to use, the price also has to be right on that RIN.”1  
In 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) outlined the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(“RFS”), a program that, among other provisions, mandated refiners, blenders and other 
obligated parties in the USA to blend biofuels with a share of their diesel and gasoline 
production. Since then, the program has greatly changed and become more complex, mainly due 
to a major reform that was put in place in 2008, releasing a new program, the Renewable Fuel 
Standard 2, (“RFS2”). The RFS2 includes mandates on different types of biofuel, requires the 
application of a complex lifecycle greenhouse gas performance measure and boosts the required 
volumes from obligated parties compared to the RFS1 (McMartin and Noyes, 2010 and OPIS, 
2009). 
Without getting into much detail, which we will do later on, the program works the following 
way: 
Estimating the amount of fuel to be consumed in the USA for a certain year, the EPA decides on 
a general mandate, the aggregate quantity of biofuels that needs to be blended by the obligated 
parties. After deciding upon the general mandate, the EPA divides the mandate among the 
different obligated parties, based on their market share in the US blending sector. Companies 
must show that they complied with their mandates by registering so called Renewable 
                                                
1 'Lord of the RINs' panel addresses hedging, markets, Biodiesel Magazine, Feb 8th 2011 
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Identification Numbers (“RINs”) in the system the agency provides. These numbers are 
generated by producers and importers of biofuels, but can only be separated by blenders and 
refiners. The action that enables an obligated party to separate a RIN and therefore use it for 
compliance purposes is the actual blending of the fuel that generated the RIN with gasoline or 
diesel.  
Here lies a very important characteristic of the RIN: it’s tradability. This is crucial because it 
enables companies with a more efficient supply chain to blend more biofuel than is mandated 
and sell the credits generated by this excess blending to companies with a more costly, or 
inefficient, biofuel supply chain.  
This work attempts to deepen the understanding of the effect of RINs’ tradability in the ethanol 
industry. It is based on the assumption that, whenever RINs are traded among companies, 
efficiencies are created through a reduction in the associated transportation and procurement 
costs. A part of the RIN’s price is therefore the logistics cost savings achieved by a blender2 in 
avoiding physically blending ethanol.  
Motivation 
RINs allow companies to trade paper instead of biofuel. Because transportation is a major cost in 
commodities trading, tradability allows for a potentially significant positive welfare impact. 
Knowing how RINs affect transported quantities of ethanol is of interest to many sectors, such as 
railroad and truck companies, policy makers and the ethanol industry as a whole. Furthermore, 
reducing the amount of transported ethanol, without reducing the total blending quantity should 
have a positive environmental impact.  
                                                
2 The terms blender, refiner and obligated party will be used without distinction throughout this work.  
   3 
This work provides a number of contributions.  First, the analysis is timely in that RINs have 
now been traded for more than two years, providing a history of trading data. This availability of 
data will help us to provide context for the model, as well as assess the validity of the results. 
Second, this paper attempts to bring an estimate of the size of the RIN market. It has been 
discussed whether RINs will or will not become an environmental currency (McPhail 2010, 
Thompson et al 2009), such as carbon credits, and become liquid tradable assets. This will be 
highly dependent on the physical ethanol market and its relation to the crude oil and blending 
markets. By estimating how the quantity of ethanol transported may be affected by the RINs 
market, the results from this analysis provides insights on the elasticity of RIN supply. Trading 
companies, both in the financial and physical commodity sides, can use this information to 
decide upon investment strategies. Should they invest in a trading platform for RINs, or focus on 
physical blending? Is there a profitable future in RINs trading? All these questions continue to be 
asked by the industry with no clear answers. While directly answering this question is not the 
primary goal of this analysis, it does provide an insightful framework which could be adapted for 
use by those whose business is related to these markets. 
Third, very little empirical work has been done on RINs, probably due to the lack of available 
public data and the relatively small amount that they represent in the refining business3. The 
RINs market can be better understood, and its impacts better measured, through analysis of the 
supply chain of ethanol as a whole, rather than focusing only on RINs.  
Finally, possibly the biggest contribution of this research is to shed light on an important 
component of the RIN market that has thus far been neglected in previous work (e.g.,McPhail 
                                                
3 In 2010, the mandated quantity of general biofuels to be blended, Type R, was 8.25% of the total volume destined 
to transportation, which accounts for about half the total volume of fuel produced in the refineries 
(www.eia.doe.gov). 
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2010, de Gorter and Just, 2010, Babcock et. al 2010), namely the costs incurred by refiners to 
procure and transport the ethanol from the producers. 
Structure	  of	  the	  Work	  
In Chapter 2, we provide a practical and yet detailed picture of the RIN market. More 
specifically, we will describe the whole RIN supply chain, from the moment it is generated to the 
moment it is either delivered to the EPA or expired. Given the current lack of understanding on 
RINs market functioning, it is important to provide a detailed discussion of the market. Three 
important aspects of RINs are highlighted: 1) the legislation that creates and regulates them, 2) 
how ethanol producers and obligated parties use them, and 3) approaches that have been used in 
the limited academic research on the RINs market. 
Chapter 3 outlines how RINs relate to the ethanol supply chain. To understand their importance, 
and analysis of the underlying fundamentals of ethanol and blending, especially transportation is 
required. RINs are important precisely because of their effect in the supply chain. Thus, their 
importance can’t be measured only by their prices and traded volumes. A thorough analysis of 
several focal points of the supply chain is also required. 
Chapter 4 outlines the model used for the analysis, which includes the following important 
factors: blending margins, transportation costs, mandated quantities and RIN prices and 
quantities. 
In Chapter 5, the results from the model are reported and interpreted, with insights on how the 
different variables affect the ethanol blending market. Data from the Oil Price Information 
Service (OPIS) is then used to construct historical blend margins and RIN prices which are used 
to contextualize the results, keeping in mind the model’s limitations.. 
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Chapter 6 provides a summary of the analysis along with some conclusions and possible 
extensions of the model for future research. A list of references is included as Chapter 7, and 
supporting material can be found in the Appendix section. 
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What are RINs? 
Overview 
At the end of each year, obligated parties have to show the EPA that they have complied with the 
mandate. The RINs are the accounting system through which these obligated parties show the 
EPA that they have complied with their obligations (FAPRI, 2009 and OPIS, 2009).  The 
importance or RINs and our interest in it, derives from its tradability. Without tradability, every 
obligated party would have to physically blend all the mandated volume. Not only would it be 
more expensive for the parties to do so, but also the EPA would most likely have much higher 
costs of enforcement. Since RINs began trading in 2009, obligated parties having an economic 
incentive to use more biofuel than their mandates require have been able to do so and sell the 
excess in the marketplace.  
To make it more complex, RINs don’t have to be traded within obligated parties. Anyone can 
trade them, as long as they are registered with the EPA. The market size of RINs therefore is 
limited in the amount of RINs that can be generated, or gallons of ethanol that can be produced 
and blended4, but depending on how much “speculation” occurs, each RIN can be traded back 
and forth many times before it matures. 
RINs are a game changer for the ethanol industry. The decision making process for obligated 
parties – blenders and refiners - is greatly affected by the existence of the RINs market.  
                                                
4 Once there are enough RINs that the mandate is fulfilled, there is no point in generating extra RINs. It doesn’t 
mean that there will be no extra blending. Blending can exist above the mandate if it is profitable. 
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The underlying market of every RIN is the fuel market in which the biofuel associated with the 
RIN is blended. For corn-based ethanol, gasoline is the relevant market for the decision between 
RIN trading or physical blending. For biodiesel, it is the diesel market in which entities are 
targeting their decisions. 
Legal Background 
In order to implement the provisions from The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”), the EPA 
adopted a program called RFS1.  Two years later, EISA passed by Congress and the RFS1 
program was greatly revised through a lengthy transition process.  
On May 5, 2009, the EPA proposed rules based on the changes that the EISA had made to the 
RFS program. These changes established a new regulatory scheme, the RFS2. The length of the 
legislation process illustrates the complexity and controversial nature of this piece of legislation.   
The usual 60-day public comment period was extended to 120 days. During this period, which 
ended on September 25th, workshops and public hearings were held and written comments were 
accepted to allow public feedback. After the comment period, EPA took another 4 months to 
review all of the public comments, adapt the rules, and publish the final version. The 
administrator finally signed the Final Rules for the new regulations implementing RFS2 on 
February 3rd 2010. The timeframe between the proposal of the rule and its signature allowed the 
authorities and general public to adapt the legislation in a way that would not be too demanding 
for the industry (McMartin and Noyes, 2010). 
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The Mandate 
Annual mandates are set through 2022, increasing to 36 billion gallons each year by the end of 
this period (RFA, 2011). The respective mandates, by year and type of biofuel, can be found in 
table 1. 
Table 1 – Mandates per type of biofuel until 2022 
 
The way to read this table is by understanding that its specificity increases from the right to the 
left. This means that you can always replace a mandate that is less specific with a more specific. 
Biodiesel and cellulosic mandates have to be fulfilled by their standards; the advanced biofuels 
mandate can be met using either advanced biofuel, biodiesel or cellulosic and the regular 
mandate can be met with any combination of A, B and C as long as they add up to the mandate. 
The opposite is not true. Biodiesel and cellulosic mandates can’t be met with any other type of 
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biofuel other than those that meet their descriptions; the advanced mandate can’t be met with the 
regular mandate, no matter at what quantity you are trying to replace them. 
It is important to note that the EPA has the authority to change the mandates. This authority has 
been used for the cellulosic mandate, which was reduced by more than 90% from the value 
reported in table 1 for 20105. This provision is key and may lead to moral hazard issues. The 
obligated parties may understand that, when the mandated level requires a large expenditures, the 
authority will waive their obligation to blend, and instead of investing in developing a way to 
comply, they will coordinate efforts in lobbying for waivers. 
In order to comply with a certain category, the whole biofuel’s pathway and its energetic content 
have to comply with EPA’s specifications. Each category can be met with certain pathways and 
have to reduce GHG emissions to a certain threshold.  
As we already said, the mandate is a quantity of biofuel that needs to be blended and the RINs 
are the accounting procedure through what obligated parties prove compliance. Tradability 
allows for increased efficiency, since companies have different production costs. But how does 
this accounting system work? What does this number, the RIN tell us? 
RIN 101 – how to “read” a RIN? 
A RIN is a 38-digit number, each with a specific meaning, so that they are unique and traceable. 
Using the EPA’s notation, a RIN takes the following form: 
KYYYYCCCCFFFFFBBBBBRRDSSSSSSSSEEEEEEEE 
Below, the meaning of each character (OPIS, 2009): 
                                                
5 For a discussion about the feasibility of the cellulosic mandate, see Kelsi Bracmort, 2010. 
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K:  Distinguishes assigned and separated RINs. 
YYYY:  The year when the biofuel was either produced or imported. 
CCCC:  Company ID 
FFFFF:  Facility ID 
BBBBB:  Batch Number 
RR:  Code for the Equivalence Value 
D:   The renewable fuel category 
SSSSSSSS: Start of RIN block 
EEEEEEE:  End of RIN block 
Thus, the RINs themselves provide a significant amount of information, such as the company 
and facility where the biofuel was produced, when the biofuel was produced its size, or how 
many gallons are represented by that RIN,  and the type of biofuel it represents.  
Special attention must be directed to understanding the renewable fuel category value (D). These 
categories are those reported for the various mandate values in table 1. In order to qualify for a 
specific category of biofuel, there are a number of requirements that a biofuel has to meet. The 
eligibility is based on: 
1) Types of feedstock used; 
2) The land used to grow the feedstock for renewable fuel production; 
3) The processes used to convert feedstock into fuel; 
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4) Lifecycle greenhouse gas emission compared to the fuel (gasoline or diesel) that is 
being displaced. 
With that in mind, the requirements for each type of biofuel are: 
Type R – Renewable Fuel 
 Renewable Fuel is the least specific type of biofuel. It is the general mandate and requires 
only that the lifecycle analysis of the fuel in analysis points to total emissions of 80% or less of 
that of the fuel being displaced (i.e. at least a 20% reduction in GHG emissions). 
Type A – Advanced Biofuel 
 This category comprises any renewable fuel, other than ethanol made from cornstarch for 
which lifecycle GHG emissions are less than half of the gasoline or diesel that is being displaced 
(i.e. at least a 50% reduction in GHG emissions).  
Type B – Biomass-Based Diesel 
As the name suggests, Biomass-Based Diesel is any kind of diesel produced from biomass 
feedstock. However, there are three restrictions for a biofuel to generate a type B RIN. First, it 
has to be produced from renewable biomass. Second, its lifecycle GHG emissions have to be at 
least 50% less than that of the fuel being displaced and finally, the renewable fuel can’t be 
derived from co-processing biomass with any petroleum feedstock simultaneously. 
Type C – Cellulosic Biofuel 
Cellulosic Biofuel is the type of biofuel derived from any cellulose, hemicellulose or lignin, as 
long as originated from renewable biomass. The lifecycle GHG emission reduction target for 
Cellulosic biofuel is the strictest, targeting a 60% reduction.  
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Market	  Input	  
The information and discussion in this section is based on discussions with representatives in the 
ethanol blending and trading industries. Their opinions provided important insights into the 
markets for ethanol production, blending and trading, the decision making processes used in 
these industries, and how RINs are viewed and used by practitioners.  
It was clear from these discussions that a general lack of understanding of RINS and trading 
continues to persist in this industry. Among the points of confusion, RIN maturity and expiration 
seems to be the biggest point of uncertainty. Other issues are whether EPA will credibly enforce 
the target mandates or continue to provide waivers, and if support to domestic ethanol through 
tax credits and tariffs to imported biofuels will persist. Although hard to measure, it is likely that 
all these uncertainties have some impact in the RIN price and in the blending decisions made by 
refiners.  
Another general theme of these discussion was that RINs, for conventional ethanol, are not a 
primary concern in blending decisions. Refiners seem to be focusing blending decisions on the 
economics, or spread between ethanol and gasoline, as well as the relative prices of other fuel 
additives. RINs tend to be viewed as a spillover effect of the different blending margins across 
the regions. These opinions are most likely due to the fact that, over the past few years, the 
margin between ethanol and gasoline has favored physical blending to that of purchasing 
separated RINs to fulfill individual mandates. Those who blended more did it to cash in the tax 
incentives and the blending margin, and therefore “any” additional revenue from a RIN would be 
welcome.  
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Another issue constantly raised was that the decision between blending or buying RINs is not 
really important for a refinery, because it represents a relatively small part of their business. To 
put it in perspective, the mandate level for 2010 was 8.25% of the total transportation fuel 
output, which accounts for about half of the total output of the refineries. Therefore, choosing 
between blending and buying RINs is just a margin opportunity to be chased that applies only to 
approximately 4% of a refinery’s business. 
One motivating point of this research was confirmed through these discussions: RINs tend to 
flow from the Midwest to obligated parties in coastal areas. This concept is further explored later 
in this thesis. 
RIN chronology and supply chain 
The life of a RIN starts with the production or import of a batch of biofuel. Whenever one of the 
two happens, a RIN is generated. Following its generation, the RIN needs to move down in the 
supply chain, or else it will not be serving its purpose of substituting fossil fuels. The next step 
after generation is triggered by the sale of the biofuel batch to an obligated party such as a refiner 
or blender.  It is only the obligated party that is going to blend the ethanol who can separate the 
RIN from the underlying biofuel. The rationale is that what EPA wants to control is the amount 
of biofuel blended in the USA, rather than the amount produced. Ethanol produced does not 
generate positive environmental impact unless it is substituting less environmental friendly fuels. 
Once separated, RINs can be traded between parties and its lifetime is over when it is either used 
for compliance or expires. 
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The EPA allows for obligated parties to borrow RINs from future periods or to bank RINs to use 
in the following period, up to 20% of their mandate. If Y0 denotes the year when the ethanol was 
produced, the scheme below summarizes the RINs chronology. 
Figure 1 – RIN Lifecycle 
 
If a batch of ethanol is produced in calendar year Y0, it can be either sold in Y0, Y1 or prior to 
March inY2. Based on the banking and borrowing provisions, a Y0 RIN can be used for 
compliance of an obligated party’s mandates related to Y-2, Y-1, Y0 or Y1.  
A RIN generated at any time from January 1st to December 31st in Y0 will have the same 
effective maturity. This RIN would be valid to comply with Y0’s mandate, in which case they 
need to be delivered prior to March of Y1. They will also be valid to comply with up to 20% of 
the mandate of Y1, and in that case would need to be delivered prior to March of Y2. A RIN 
generated in Y0 may also be used for compliance of up to 20% of Y-1’s mandate, in case it was 
not fulfilled.  
Generation!
Separation!
Compliance/
Expiration!
Y-2! Y-1! Y1! Y2!Y0!
T
R
A
D
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N
G
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The matter of RIN maturity is very complex and even people in the industry have had trouble 
keeping track of and registering RINs in accordance with official regulations. 
The Geography of Ethanol and RINs 
The geographical variance in the locations of refiners and ethanol producers in the USA should 
be a defining issue in the flow of RINs and Ethanol.  It is no secret, and very understandable, that 
most of the ethanol in the USA is produced close to the supply of corn. Lambert et al. (2008) 
explain this phenomenon, concluding that the availability of feedstock dominates the site 
selection decision for ethanol plants. The Corn Belt, extending from North Dakota to Ohio, is 
one of the most efficient corn producing areas on the planet. Huge plains, extremely developed 
logistics, years of investment in technology and improving yields have made the region an 
agricultural heaven in the USA, and the world’s largest producer of corn. Because logistics is an 
important part of the cost in grain crushing, when the ethanol industry in the USA started to 
develop, most of the production capacity was installed in the Corn Belt.  
As obvious as it is that ethanol production capacity should be close to the availability of corn, it 
is also obvious that refineries should be close to the availability of oil and the consumer market. 
Therefore, refining capacity is concentrated in the coastal USA. Table 2 shows this phenomenon 
very clearly, where the ethanol production and mandate values reported are for 20106.  
                                                
6 Mandates were estimated using the 8.25% ratio from the EPA and 50% of production assumed to be used in 
transportation fuels. 
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Table 2 – Top 10 States in ethanol production capacity and in mandated obligation 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the ethanol production capacity and the estimated mandate of every State 
in the USA. The darker shaded areas in each map represent states with greater ethanol production 
and blending capacity, respectively. Because refiners need to blend the ethanol in order to 
comply with their mandates, it is obvious that a significant amount of ethanol may need to travel 
long distances between producers and fuel blenders. 
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Figure 2 – Ethanol production capacity map. 
 
Figure 3 – Mandates map 
 
Truck, railroad, barge or pipelines can be used to transport ethanol. However, there is still no 
ethanol pipeline infrastructure in the USA, due to its corrosive characteristics and lack of 
relevant scale to enable the capital investments needed to develop such logistics. According to 
the USDA (2007), the market share per modal is close to 60%, 30% and 10% to railcars, trucks 
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and barge respectively. A simplified scheme of the logistic chain from the farm to the gas retailer 
is provided in figure 3. 
Figure 4 – Ethanol distribution system 
 
Cheap access to ethanol is an incentive to physically blend, while the lack of cheap ethanol 
access is an incentive to buy RINs (Lambert et al. 2008). This translates into a competitive 
advantage for those blenders close to the Corn Belt relative to those in other regions when 
competing for the same batch of ethanol.  
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Literature Review 
The literature on RINs is very scarce. In the first place, RINs are a relatively new market. Adding 
to that, for most of the time they have been around, oil prices have been so high that blending 
ethanol has been a profitable option for refiners, so the mandate has not been binding. 
Still, there are a few studies that have helped shape the ideas that academia and markets have of 
RINs today, and some others that are important in the context of understanding the ethanol 
supply chain. 
Much of the economic theory behind the biofuel mandates can be extracted from De Gorter and 
Just (2009). They have detailed the general economics of biofuel mandates, and assessed how 
different outcomes may arise when mandates are coupled with other forms of subsidies.  One of 
their main conclusions was that tax credit will subsidize fuel consumption instead of biofuels if 
implemented alongside a mandate. They estimate a cost of over 20 billion dollars a year for the 
ethanol tax credits alone in 20227. 
Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff (2010) approached the RIN problem more directly and 
unraveled the RFS2 concluding, among other things, that RIN prices should be hierarchical and 
rollover provisions would allow stock holding.  They also explain that the price of a RIN should 
be no less than its “core value”. They illustrate their findings with a series of supply and use 
tables.  In a FAPRI-MU report, Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff (2009) argue that the three 
forces that determine the core value of a RIN are the gap between prices fuel blenders pay to buy 
biofuels and the implicit price of biofuels in the blended fuel, the transaction costs associated 
with RINs, and market expectations regarding the credibility of mandates being enforced in 
                                                
7 This estimates suggest tax credits to remain unchanged until then, which is highly unlikely. 
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future periods. In a previous article, Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff (2009)reached similar 
conclusions and stated their belief that the cost of the mandate ends up being borne by 
consumers, due to a competitive landscape in the refining sector.  
Using a dynamic programming approach, McPhail (2010) modeled the optimal allocation 
problem for a company facing the decision of either blending fuel or buying RINS. Her model 
was used to predict the impact on RIN prices for different scenarios. Among her findings is that 
the prices of RINs under a supply shock caused by corn yields advancing to 174 bushels/acre 
would fall 2 cents and in the case where corn yields went down to 134 bushels/acre, they would 
go up 2 cents. It is an interesting result, but on the other hand, it shows that a corn supply shock 
is actually very small compared to overall importance of transportation costs and blending 
margins.   
Many industry reports were issued, detailing the procedures for trading RINs and summarizing 
key points. Several industry reports focused in how RINs are classified, the requirements for 
each class of RINs, the timeframe for trading them and much more (McMartin and Noyes 2011, 
RFA 2011, OPIS 2009, FAPRI 2009). These reports were a valuable source for answering 
practical questions concerning market functioning. 
While there is a very close relationship between corn, ethanol prices and the core value of a RIN, 
important factors were left out of the analysis in all these previous studies. Maybe the importance 
of RINs should be measured not by the RIN market itself, but by the spillover effects that it has 
in other markets, such as transportation and blending.   
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The Model 
The idea behind the model is to understand how the ethanol is transported in the USA at different 
levels of blending margins to comply with the mandates, the transportation costs associated with 
these movements, and the RIN prices which will result when the RIN market is introduced. More 
specifically, who are the net buyers and sellers of ethanol and RINs, what are the total costs 
associated with ethanol transportation from producers to blenders, and what gains does the RIN 
market provide in terms of reducing these transportation costs. The model focuses on how 
blending margins, RIN prices, and transportation costs shape the ethanol supply chain. 
To help develop the model, data was collected from a number of different sources. The 
transportation costs were obtained from Hughes (2009) which analyzed the market power of 
railroads in the ethanol transportation business. The TC8 constant used in this analysis was the 
mean price of a railcar divided by the mean distance run of a railcar reported in Hughes (2009).  
Ethanol and gasoline prices for Los Angeles, Chicago, the Gulf of Mexico and New York were 
collected from OPIS (2009, 2010 and 2011).  
Distances between each ethanol producer and refiner were estimated using the Haversine 
Formula9, using the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates for the center of the county in which 
they are located, obtained with Google Earth. This formula assumes the Earth as a sphere and 
measures the arc between two points in its surface. Inconsistencies may arise from the fact that 
the Earth is not a sphere and from relevant altitude differences. To check for inconsistencies, 100 
                                                
8 Transportation Cost variable. Is the constant that represents the cost of transporting a1 gallon of ethanol for 1 km. 
9 Calculated in Excel, using the following formula àACOS(SIN(lat1)*SIN(lat2)+COS(lat1)*COS(lat2)*COS(lon2-
lon1))*6371, 
where 6371 is the Earth radius measured in kilometers, lat1 and lat2 the latitudes of the refiner and the ethanol 
producer and lon1 and lon2 their longitudinal coordinates. 
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producer-refiner pairs in the data were randomly selected with the distance between the parties 
computed using Google Earth. In 95% of the cases, the distances obtained by Google Earth were 
within a 10% range from those calculated with the Haversine Formula. A distance matrix ![!  !"] 
of 213 ethanol producers (i) by 141 refiners (j) was then constructed, where each value !!,! in the 
matrix represents the distance between the ethanol producer i10 and the refiner j11. 
Each ethanol producer receives a fixed price for a gallon of ethanol and gasoline prices are the 
same for every refiner. There is a fixed price to transport 1 gallon of ethanol for 1 km, TC. The 
blending margin, B, is defined as PxGas - PxEth, or the price of gasoline minus the price of 
ethanol. A summary of the model variables is provided in table 3. 
Table 3 – Summary of variables 
 
 
Baseline Scenario: The refiner’s minimization problem without RINs  
The model baseline represents a scenario where there is a mandate but no RIN tradability. In this 
scenario, companies are trying to minimize their costs in sourcing ethanol. In order to have a 
                                                
10 Ethanol producers list obtained from RFA (http://www ethanolrfa.org) 
11 Refiners and Blenders list obtained in EIA (http://www.eia.gov/neic/rankings/refineries.htm) 
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more precise view of the specific costs of each refinery, the cost of sourcing ethanol was defined 
as a function of the distance from which the ethanol is brought. 
Before RINs are introduced in the model, companies minimize their cost of sourcing ethanol to 
comply with the mandate. This cost function to be minimized is given by: 
!"#$!%"&' = !"#!!,!    !!,! ∗ (−! + !!,! ∗ !")!,!   (1) 
The solution to the baseline scenario takes into consideration the following constraints: 
!!,!! ≥   !!   (2) !!,!! ≤   !"#$%&'!   (3) !!,!! ≤   !"#$%&!   (4) 
In equation 1, total compliance cost is minimized with respect to !!,!, the amount of ethanol 
bought and transported from producer i to refiner j. The constraint inequation 2 states that the 
total amount of ethanol refiner j buys from all producers i has to at least be enough to fulfill its 
mandate, !!. The individual refiner mandates were set using the target levels for 2011 and 
dividing according to the 2010 market share of the refiners. 
The constraints in equations 3 and 4 represent the production and refining capacity constraints. 
For the production capacity, the installed ethanol production capacity per plant was obtained 
from the RFA12, and the refining capacity was determined as 10% of the total blending capacity 
of an obligated party. The blending capacities for each refiner were obtained from the EPA. The 
                                                
12 Renewable Fuels Association 
   24 
10% threshold is used because it is the maximum amount of ethanol that can be blended with 
gasoline in the pump and still be sold as conventional fuel. Some refineries blend up to 85% of 
ethanol in the gasoline, but the number of E-85 pumps is still relatively small and concentrated in 
the Midwest13. Also, E-15 blends were already approved, but only cars produced since 2007 can 
use these blends. If E-85 becomes more relevant in the future, the constraints could easily be 
modified to reflect the availability of these pumps for individual refiners. 
The solution to the model is a matrix ![!  !"], where every !!,! represents the quantity of ethanol 
that producer i  sold to refiner j. The total cost of market compliance, for the B and TC chosen is (!!,! ∗!,!   !!,! ∗ !"), and each refiner’s cost of compliance is (!!,! ∗!   !!,! ∗ !"). 
The refiner’s minimization problem with RIN’s 
When RINs are introduced to the model, the obligated parties’ decision-making process takes 
into account a new parameter, namely the price of RINs and ability to use RINs for mandate 
compliance. If the refiner foresees a determined price of RIN for the period, this price basically 
sets a standard of how much he is willing to pay for the ethanol. Let’s imagine that ethanol and 
gasoline are at the same price, and therefore the refiner is indifferent between blending ethanol or 
not. If he needs to bring ethanol to his facility to fulfill the mandate, he will spend a certain 
amount in transportation. If he buys RINs, he can source a smaller volume of ethanol. Whenever 
he has an opportunity to bring in a gallon from a producer that is close enough to him so that it 
will be cheaper than the projected price of a RIN, he will blend physically. Whenever RIN prices 
                                                
13 Detailed info in http://e85vehicles.com/e85-stations.html 
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are below procurement costs, the blender can purchase RINs for compliance and reduce their 
physical blending amounts.14. 
Compliance costs to be minimized when a RIN market exists are given by: 
!"#$%&' = !"#!!,!    !!,! ∗ (−! + !!,! ∗ !")!,! + !"#! ∗ !"#$%&#'!   (5) 
where the second term on the right hand side represents the revenue or expenditures associated 
with selling or buying RINs. The same capacity constraints that producers and refiners face in 
the no RINs scenario (equations 3 and 4) are in place, but the refiner no longer needs to 
physically blend enough volume to fulfill its mandate. Therefore, the mandate constraint defined 
by equation 2 is replaced by 
!!,!! +   !"#! ≥   !!   (6) 
Conditional on a RIN price and other parameter values (i.e. B and TC), the solution for this 
model will yield the matrix ![!  !"]and the net RIN position, !"#!, for each refiner. 
To close the model, the market-clearing price for RINs is that which results in an aggregate net 
RIN position of zero, or !"#! = 0! . When this occurs, it means that, at that price of RIN, there 
will be refiners willing to buy as many RINs as there will be refiners willing to sell. Since each 
refiner needs to fulfill its obligation through either RIN trade or physical blending, we know that 
if the sum of RINs traded is zero, the total amount of ethanol blended was at least as large as the 
mandate.  
                                                
14 Notice that the model does not incorporate the fact that refiners may bank or borrow RINs up to 20% of their 
mandates. In the model, all the ethanol blended converts into a RIN that is separated and used for compliance in the 
same period (year). 
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Summarizing, when RINs are included, the solution is the Q[!  !"] matrix plus a market clearing 
RIN price, and is dependent on our distance matrix D[!  !"], transportation cost TC, and blending 
margin B. 
Solving for Various Blending Margins 
The blending margin represents the savings opportunity for a blender when adding one gallon of 
ethanol to its production instead of one gallon of gasoline. Part of the blending margin is the 
VEETC, a credit that refiners receive for every gallon of ethanol that they blend. In our model, 
the tax credit and the price difference are encompassed in the variable B. We used several values 
of B to understand how this variable affects the specific (per company) and the overall cost of 
complying with the mandate, the ethanol distribution pattern and the amount of RINs traded. 
Blending margins have been very high in the last years, so this variable has probably played the 
biggest role in keeping RIN prices low, despite the transportation cost of ethanol, as will be 
illustrated by the results in the next section. Blending margins in the range of -10 cents to +100 
cents were used, which represent more than 90% of the daily observation values for margins 
from the OPIS gasoline and ethanol price data. To further illustrate the approach used in solving 
the model, the chart below shows the results for an arbitrary blending margin of 0 cents, 
provided purely to give a visual understanding of the framework.  
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Figure 5 – Supply and demand of RINs for different RIN prices and B=0 cents 
 
In figure 2 the theoretical supply and demand of RINs is reported for a given value of B=0 
cents15 across a range of RIN prices. The only point that matters to our analysis is the 
intersection, where demand for RINs equals supply for RINs and the market clears. The way this 
chart is built is by measuring, at every different RIN price, how many RINs would be put in the 
market for sale and how many would be demanded. 
  
                                                
15 We fix the value of B at 0 cents and run the optimization for values of PxRIN from 1 to 15 cents. In every point 
where there is a RIN balance different than 0, it is not a market outcome. The clearing market solution, which is the 
only point that will matter to us, is the point where the RIN balance is equal  
zero, or 11.6 cents. 
!"#$%%%&%%'!
!"($%%%&%%'!
!)!!!!
!($%%%&%%!!
!#$%%%&%%!!
!*$%%%&%%!!
!+$%%%&%%!!
!,%$%%%&%%!!
!,($%%%&%%!!
,! (! -! #! .! *! /! +! 0! ,%! ,,! ,(! ,-! ,#! ,.!
!"
#
$%&
'
())
(*
+$
,%
-.!(+%%&/0+1$,%
!"#$%$&'() *+,,%-) .("$&/)
   28 
Results 
The Baseline Scenario 
In the baseline scenario, every refiner fulfills the mandate and there is no RINs trading. Using a 
TC of 0.00875 cents per km-gallon and setting B = 0, the model estimates a total ethanol 
sourcing cost of $979 million, which is in line with the projections from EPA and the (USDA 
2007), where it has been estimated to be somewhere between $600 million and $1 billion in 
2008.  In order to have a measure that does not depend on the value of the constant TC, costs are 
also reported in km-gallons16 when comparing the scenarios. In the base case, the total km-
gallons were 11.2 trillion. 
The average sourcing distance of ethanol in the absence of a blending margin and no RIN market 
was about 908 km, which means that on average, refiners had to pay to transport ethanol for 908 
km. At the TC we used, this means that the average cost of transportation component of ethanol 
was about 8 cents per gallon. 
Presence of RINs 
When the model was solved allowing for RINs to be traded, lower compliance costs were 
achieved, as expected. At the equilibrium RIN price, for blending margins between -10 and +100 
cents, the total transportation expenses ranged from 5 to 7 trillion km-gallons. This represents a 
decrease of about 40% in the amount of ethanol transported in most cases. The average distance 
from the ethanol sourced in the presence of RINs is about 600 km, also close to 40 percent less 
than what it would be without a RIN market. Of course, now the average cost that refiners pay to 
                                                
16 Total km-gallons is the product of the amount of ethanol transported multiplied by the distance transported. So, if 
for example a railcar with 29,000 gallons travel for 1,000 km, this measure increases by 29 million km-gallons. 
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bring 1 gallon of ethanol to their facility is also much lower than it was, at around 5 cents per 
gallon.  
Figure 6 – USD Savings from a RIN market at different values of B 17 18 
 
                                                
17 Values of savings in km-gallons can be found in Table 11 in the appendix. 
 
18 To illustrate how the savings happen in aggregate, let’s follow the example of one refiner in Texas and see how 
RINs affect it’s earnings. This refiner’s mandate is to blend 200.5 million gallons. Without RINs the average cost of 
this producer per gallon of ethanol sourced is 11.39 cents and his total compliance cost is $22.8 million. 
 
When RINs are available and B=0, the PxRIN in equilibrium is 11.67 cents. The total amount blended by this 
refiner in this case is 39.3 million gallons at an average cost of 8.9 cents per gallon. He has to complete his mandate 
by buying 200.5 – 39.3 = 161.2 million RINs. Therefore, his cost of compliance when RINs are present is  
39.3 million gallons * 8.9 cents per gallon + 11.67 cents per RIN * 161.2 million RINs = 22.3 million USD. 
 
This particular refiner saved $500 thousand by the existence of a RIN mandate.  
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Figure 7 - % Savings from a RIN market at different values of B 
 
The Blending Margin and the Equilibrium Price of RINs 
The equilibrium price of RINs holds a linear relation to the blending margin.  !"#$%&' = !"#!!,!    !!,! ∗ (−! + !!,! ∗ !")!,! + !"#! ∗ !"#$%&#'!   (5) 
Because in equilibrium the second term in the right hand side of equation (5)19 will equal zero, 
and because !,!!,!   !"#  !" are exogenous, the same matrix !!,! will always be yielded. Since we 
are multiplying !!,! by a constant, no matter what the constant is, the optimal !!,! is the one that 
will yield the minimum value of the product  !!,! ∗ (! + !!,! ∗ !")!,! . 
That said, when we add 1 cent to B we are adding one cent to the cost of each gallon of ethanol 
for the same refiners. The RIN price that will bring the equilibrium to the market now will, of 
course, be 1 cent higher than before. 
                                                
19 !"#! ∗ !"#$%&#'!  
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These results can be viewed in figure 10 in the appendix.  
When the margin is too high, the mandate is non-binding, and there are more companies 
interested in blending extra gallons. When this happens, there is an oversupply of RINs. In this 
case, companies compete for the ethanol and production is above the mandate. Our model does 
not incorporate dynamics in the price of ethanol, but it is likely that in such a scenario, prices 
would rise due to competition among blenders, reducing blending margins. 
A very important addition when discussing the results here is that the current model is based on a 
single period, most easily interpreted as represented a calendar year. Because trading happens 
daily in practice, margins are continuously changing. Ethanol storage and production capacity 
are also constrained, therefore it is not likely that very low blending margins will persist. If very 
low or very high margins last long, the storage and banking provisions would probably play a 
major role in the equilibrium, and while this model does not consider this, it is an important issue 
for future analysis of the RINs market.  
Transportation Costs 
The transportation cost component of a RIN is the cost of moving a gallon of ethanol from the 
producer to the blender. When B=0 or is close to the transportation cost, it should drive the price 
of RINs. Since blending margins have been relatively high, or physical blending has been 
profitable, since RINs began trading in 2009,  logistics have not yet been playing a determinant 
role. This framework gives some predictability of how this scenario will impact ethanol blended 
quantities and refiners potential profits. 
The clearest way analyze the impact of transportation costs in the context of RINs is through 
examining outcomes for different blend margin ranges and describing what happens in each 
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interval. The ranges were defined as B ≥ 16 cents, 11.6 cents ≤ B ≤ 16 cents, 0 cents ≤ B ≤ 11.6 
cents and B ≥ 0 cents.  
B ≥ 16 cents 
Using TC=0.00875 cents per km-gallon and for B  ≥ 16 cents, all the ethanol capacity in the 
USA will be absorbed by the refining industry, regardless of the existence of a RINs market or 
federal mandates. This result is contingent on the TC we used, but the model can be easily 
adapted to different TC’s  and even non constant TC’s if, for example, the model was adapted to 
add the possibility of using multimodal transportation. The meaning of this finding is that the 
blending capacity and the ethanol production capacity in the USA are installed geographically in 
a way that, for a TC=0.00875 cents per km-gallon the ethanol producers will find buyers for all 
their production as long as the price of gasoline is at least 16 cents over that of ethanol. 
Remember that all producers receive the same price for a gallon of ethanol and refiners differ 
one from another through their transportation costs. 
For blending margins above 16 cents, the presence of a RIN market does not affect the quantity 
blended. This happens because, even for the minimum RIN price of 0 (zero) cents, there is 
capacity enough to blend the whole corn ethanol production of the USA at a profit. The presence 
or absence of RINs in this circumstance determines the allocation of the blending and total cost 
of compliance. The RIN scenario allocation here only determines the potential for savings, by 
determining the most profitable allocation of blending for the refining sector all together. What 
would most likely happen is that other refiners would compete for the ethanol and the overall 
result would be closer to the no RIN solution, or the price of ethanol price would rise and the 
blending margins would adjust. The current model does not include this dynamic, as is discussed 
in the section about the limitations, but could be left as a future extension to the current work.  
   33 
11.6 cents ≤ B ≤ 16 cents 
The next important blend margin range is that for which the capacity is just enough to voluntarily 
blend the mandate. At this level, 10.9 billion gallons will be blended, despite the existence of 
mandates or RINs. This value of B is 11.6 cents. At this point, there is enough blending capacity 
even for a RIN price of 0 cents. At any value of B below that, the price of RIN will need to be 
positive20 in order for the market to be cleared, a clear market being represented by as many 
RINs refiners are willing sell they are willing to buy. 
The value of 11.6 cents marks the minimum point of blending in the presence of RINs because at 
any value of B below it, the gallon being added has a cost of blending above 11.6 cents. 
During this interval, quantities blended in the RIN scenario are decreasing, starting from total 
ethanol production capacity, when B=16 cents and ending at the mandate level, when B=11.6 
cents. The quantity blended here without RINs is still at capacity. This result is surprising but 
also is in line with previous carbon-credit literature studies (Wara and Victor, 2008). 
Figure 8 – Quantity of ethanol blended with or without RINs at different B’s 
 
                                                
20 And it’s price should be valued according to PxRin =  11.6-B cents 
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This happens for a simple reason. If the blending margin is not enough to allow for voluntary 
blending to absorb all the production but is enough so that the mandate is met, then blenders will 
blend as much as possible at a profit margin. Because our model finds the minimum possible 
total cost for the refiners, in this case the maximum total profit of blending, this value will be 
exactly where the marginal gallon to be blended will cost as much as B to be brought in house. 
The most cost effective refiners will be blending these gallons.  
When RINs do no exist, regardless of their cost effectiveness, everyone needs to blend and 
therefore the “first” 10.9 billion gallons are not blended by the most cost effective. The most cost 
effective will still blend everything until they can make 0 profits in the marginal gallon, but in 
addition to that, some refiners will be blending at a negative profit, or at a cost, as they are forced 
to meet their individual mandate. 
This effect is not insignificant at all, especially when added to the next scenario. For values of B 
around 12 cents, the quantity of gallons not blended due to the existence of RINs is a little short 
of 3 billion gallons. Again, this is the result of a model where there is no price adjustment due to 
supply and demand; therefore it may not reflect reality. Still, if the blending sector acted as a 
central planner, this would be the optimal solution and at a blending margin of 12 cents, the 
potential reduction in compliance costs caused by the existence of RINs would be approximately 
$200 million .  
0 ≤ B ≤ 11.6 cents 
Blend margins between zero and 11.6 cents result in similar outcomes to those discussed in the 
previous section, but the impacts are accentuated. It is easier to understand the phenomenon here. 
Imagine B is now very close to 0, at 2 cents only. Regardless of the margin, the mandate needs to 
be fulfilled, so 10.9 billion gallons are guaranteed to be blended. But these 10.9 billion gallons 
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will not be blended in a way that optimizes total cost, because each one needs to blend their 
share of the mandate due to the absence of RINs. At any point in that interval, B + PxRin will 
equal 11.6 cents. This is the value that induces the production of 10.9 billion gallons in the 
market optimization with RINs conditional on the value of TC used in the model. Another way to 
see it is that 11.6 cents is the transportation cost of the 10.9th billion gallon of ethanol. If RINs 
were present, as we already showed, only 10.9 billion gallons could be blended at this 
combination of B and PxRin at a profit. But if the optimal cost allocation only allowed for 10.9 
billion in this circumstance, some of the blenders, when RINs are not present, will be blending at 
a higher cost. This means that there might be some extra gallons that were not used to fulfill the 
mandates and still can be blended at a profit by some refiners.   
B ≤ 0 cents 
When B=0 cents, there can be no voluntary blending21, due to non-negative transportation costs 
for all refiners. From this point on, RINs are a true opportunity for the refining sector, and can 
always improve the allocation of blending in a way that is beneficial for everyone. This is 
precisely the point where the demand and the supply of RINs are equal. As was illustrated in 
chapter 4, this point in the model is 11.6 cents above B. After this point, RINs provide the 
maximum cost savings opportunity, at over $440 million. 
Regional Differences 
As the blending margin increases or decreases, changes in blending patterns emerge. The 
detailed results can be seen in appendix table 10, which illustrates the potential gains and losses 
per state across a range of blending margins. The gains were calculated by subtracting the profits 
                                                
21 The mandate is binding for all obligated parties. 
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in the scenario without RINs from the profits in the scenario with RINs for the same blending 
margin. 
After ranking the results, it was found that the blending margin intervals discussed in the 
previous sections also play an important role in defining winners and losers when RINs are 
introduced. 
The intervals defined previously yielded the following “winners and losers” in terms of absolute 
potential gains and losses. These gains and losses were calculated as the difference between the 
sum of the costs of all refiners in a certain State in the scenario with and without RINs22.  
Table 4 – States with biggest gains and losses at different blending  
margin intervals. 23 
 
As the results show, for a binding or partially binding mandate24, being close to the ethanol 
supply is a more valuable asset. When B is very high, transportation costs are a less important 
                                                
22 (NoRINCost – RINCost) per State 
23 Wins and losses measured as the difference in  
total compliance costs per State with or without RINs 
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factor in the optimization problem and maximizing blending profits results in higher gains than 
optimizing transportation. When the mandate is binding, and blending is a cost, and the only way 
of saving is by minimizing transportation costs. Therefore, for a binding mandate, most of the 
winners are Midwest States. California is there not because they have high profits with RINs. 
Remember the way gainers and losers are defined is by their relative position. California would 
need to spend a large amount of capital to transport ethanol in case RINs could not be traded. 
The tradability provides a tool for them so save costs. States can profit from RINs by saving in 
transportation costs or by blending above their mandates and receiving revenues from the sale of 
excess RINs.  
Historical Data 
The OPIS data contains information that allows for the tracking of blending margins and RIN 
prices25 for a two-year period from May of 2009 to April of 2011. Since the beginning of our 
sample in 2009, RIN prices have traded for as high as 36 cents and have reached lows below 2 
cents. Blending margins for Chicago have ranged between -80 cents and 36 cents, excluding tax 
benefits. Margins have been below zero for most of the time, and considering the 51 to 45 cent 
VEETC credit which has been in place over this time period they have been negative at all times. 
Given these blending margins, why have RINs continued to trade at positive values? One of the 
explanations is that there is an option value associated to a RIN. Because RINs can be stored and 
rolled to future periods, the RIN separated today can be used for compliance in the future if 
margins turn positive or less negative. Therefore, there is always a non-negative value associated 
with a RIN, and a negative value would not induce a RIN holder to trade it in any circumstance. 
                                                                                                                                                       
24 Partially binding means binding for some and non-binding for other refiners, depending on their ethanol sourcing 
cost. At B=0, the mandate is binding to all obligated parties. 
25 OPIS and Dr. McPhail generously granted RIN price series.  Both series were obtained through a market research, 
since it is an OTC market. Differences in both series were unsubstantial. 
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Some of the other reasons are explored in the sections that follow. Figure 5 was obtained from 
the OPIS data and shows how the RIN price and the blending margin have behaved from May 
2009 to April 2011. 
Figure 9 – Observed values of B for Chicago   
 
Transportation Cost 
The transportation cost can explain why RINs may still trade at a positive value regardless of a 
negative value of B until a certain point. For blending margins ranging from -11.6 cents to 0 
cents, the transportation cost component of a RIN alone was estimated to be worth 11.6 cents +B. 
However, even that would not explain most of the trading timeframe that has occurred. Another 
important point that was already mentioned is that very low margins should not be sustainable 
for long periods and, due to limitations of storage and the blending wall, which were predicted at 
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10%, refiners may be limited in their ability to lock in profits for future periods. Production can 
vary slightly over time, but they can’t decide their annual, or even weekly margin in a day. This 
is a major difference between our model and daily RIN price forecasting models, such as the one 
developed by McPhail (2010). 
Other Issues 
Another possible explanation for low blending margins persisting for long periods coinciding 
with positive RIN values is that not all refiners have the ability to physically blend and handle 
ethanol. Because ethanol storage and blending requires investment in capital costs, some refiners 
may simply chose to not invest and use the RINs market for mandate compliance. There is no 
available data, to our knowledge, of ethanol storage and blending capacity inside refiners, but 
this hypothesis deserves further investigation. 
What can also drive RIN prices are market expectations for future margins and policy. Although 
margins are high, profits from this high margin cannot be completely appropriated because 
refiners are limited in the amount of ethanol that they can blend with gasoline. Even if margins 
are very high, refiners can only blend 10% to 15% of their fuel output for standard motor fuel or 
85% for E-85. The peak margins should not be used as a guide to estimate blending patterns, but 
rather average margins, because those are the ones that a refiners likely base longer-term 
blending and RIN decisions. 
The VEETC may also play an important role in the dynamics of RIN prices. At some points, 
such as November and December of 2010, blending margins were very low and so were RIN 
prices. It is not easy to predict what happen but the credit may be part of the explanation. When 
margins are at 35 cents, the total cost for a refiner to blend ethanol will probably be above 40 
   40 
cents when logistics costs are considered. If it is below 45 cents, it is still profitable to blend and 
sell a RIN for any value. The VEETC therefore, is important when the mandate is highly 
binding, allowing for blending levels to achieve mandated levels, but it distorts the market most 
of the time, when the conditions would allow for enough blending. Although this model does not 
advance the discussion of who pays for the VEETC, a component of it could be taken into 
consideration when calculating the tax hurdle, namely the logistics cost of sourcing ethanol. 
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Conclusions 
The RINs do not exist alone, and they are also not just a function of ethanol, corn and energy 
prices26. Similarly, the market impact of RINs can’t be measured only by looking at those 
relative prices. Doing so will result in a number of misunderstandings, such as positive RIN 
prices in times where the blending margin is highly negative, price increases and decreases in 
times where the “crush margin” suggests the opposite and so on.  
A more thorough understanding of RINs can be obtained only through a deeper understanding of 
how the market participants have adapted or are adapting to the new regulations, an examination 
of the decision processes of obligated parties, and how they will face the uncertainties of a highly 
regulated asset that is sometimes a hurdle, but sometimes a profitable trading opportunity, in the 
market for ethanol blended gasoline. 
An obvious candidate to explain at least part of what RINs are worth was the logistics cost. 
Through a simplified model, where logistics costs are represented only by transportation costs, 
this thesis is able to illustrate some of the benefits of the introduction of RINs through costs 
savings that may be achieved. More than the numerical results, which are highly dependent on 
context, this research illustrates that transportation is a relevant factor impacting RIN trading, 
and that the welfare gains of a RIN market may be significant. 
Welfare Distribution  
In this work, welfare is exchanged between two sectors: transportation and blending/refining. 
The results we obtained on how this welfare is transferred from one sector to the other are 
available in Figure 3, and defined as potential savings. For the TC used of 0.00875 cents per km-
                                                
26 The discussion here is based on Type R RINs, which today are almost entirely generated by corn-starch ethanol. 
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gallon, these welfare transfer ranges from around $150 to $450 million , depending on the value 
of the blending margin B.  
These aggregate welfare gains are distributed differently regionally among states. As illustrated 
in table 4, for each range of B, a different group of States may benefit or realize losses by the 
existence of a RIN market, relative to the scenario where the current mandates are still in place 
but no RINs market exists.  This regional variation stems from the use of the distance measures 
used to measure compliance costs for ethanol blending in the model. 
Quantity Blended  
A surprising effect that was found is that the quantity of ethanol blended may be reduced under a 
RIN scenario, for values of B where it is profitable for some, but not all the obligated parties to 
blend27. This is due to the fact that, under RINs, the central planner solution for blending is with 
the cheapest allocation. The marginal gallon of ethanol is, therefore, the most expensive, or this 
gallon would not have been blended. The central planner solution for the no RIN scenario is not 
the same. It is the optimal considering that everyone is required to physically blend at their 
individual mandate level. Therefore, the marginal gallon for some refiners may be below their 
costs.  
The Blending Margin 
This research shows that it is very hard to understand the RIN market with the amount of 
information available today. Because blending margins have been so vigorously negative, the 
other effects have been outplayed. Whenever the market is more stabilized and less influenced 
                                                
27 Figure 4 
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by subsidies28, other important factors are expected to emerge, especially the transportation 
costs, being taken into account for industry players and academics. 
Limitations 
There exist many limitations to this model and its use in achieving a better understanding of RIN 
markets. First, the lack of a futures market for RINs and an illiquid futures market for ethanol in 
different regions29 do not allow obligated parties to lock in positions for a long period of time. 
Expectations may therefore be playing a smaller role than may be expected.  
Another issue is the relative size of the ethanol blending and RIN trading in the refining 
business. Because the mandates account for a small share of the refiners’ business, models 
assuming optimal allocations maybe putting less focus in issues that also drive businesses, such 
as time commitment to actively participate in the RIN market, capital investments necessary to 
adapt a blender for ethanol mixtures and others. 
A better understanding of the transportation sector would also be necessary to find more robust 
results. The linear assumption of a fixed cost per km-gallon may have left some routes that are 
very profitable out, because alternative modal types were not considered, for example. 
Although much is still to be done, a strong focus in the supply chain, rather than the core value 
of RINs and basic price prediction models may be the best way to approach future analyses of 
the RINs market and its dynamics.  
                                                
28 The senate has recently voted against the subsidy for ethanol production. 
29 Industry representatives indicated that it is not a very common practice for refiners to hedge positions in ethanol 
futures market and that the volume traded for different maturities is still very small. For more details, 
www.cbot.com 
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Besides the contextual limitations, the current model is also very limited in its ability to predict 
and describe daily activity for the RIN market. Because the idea here was more to make a point 
of how an important component was being neglected than to actually closely investigate every 
single component of the market, the model includes some simplifying assumptions which limit 
its ability to provide a thorough analysis of some important characteristics of RINs and ethanol 
markets. These include uncertainty and the option value of RINs and market dynamics such as 
the banking and storage provisions. All these reasons are closely related because they allow for 
decisions to be made in various timeframes. Limiting the ability to operate with more long-term 
oriented goals, the actual industry capacity to move, and the storage of ethanol was also not 
considered in this work.  
Also, the model is not suited for predicting RIN prices. Blending quantities were modeled as 
strategic decisions assuming the market operates efficiently in yearly periods, reaching 
equilibrium through a clearing RIN price. The availability of RIN traded volume would allow for 
the incorporation of more dynamics into the model, recalculating it periodically during the year, 
but volume data is currently not available. 
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APPENDIX A – Supplemental Tables and Figures 
 
Table 5 – Refiners’ names, locations and estimated mandates 
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Table 5 (cont.) 
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")&'(,#"9)&()*&!+"'=)$@+"#"!&-'$ .;88 California <<36;635;<777777777777777
B#&'$(9#&()#9B('('>I!:$>*%9=9''9 .;8; Wyoming 503/5;38<4777777777777777
*%9F#&'*&#+,")$)":9*($= .;85 Utah 5431623<;<777777777777777
*&!+">'(9'"$(&'")9"J+&#$9B9-())9$"*&!" .;8< Washington 5<30<1305;777777777777777
%-'$*&',)@('*$-,*")&&," .;81 Alabama 553/263868777777777777777
,-'*&#9'9#>=('**&!!9#*9*($=9",$ .;86 Colorado 553;<53244777777777777777
!-#+%=&()*&#+,-+9#(&# .;82 Wisconsin 5;320838<1777777777777777
'-,$"#9'9#>=)++"-),A&#& .;8/ New Jersey 5835<63288777777777777777
")&'(,#"9)&()*&!+"'=)$@)&'>A9"*% .;84 California ;030;031;0777777777777777
B)=('>D('*'&#$%,")$)":9 .;80 Utah ;4360;3164777777777777777
'-,$"#9'9#>=)+,"F"''"% .;;8 Georgia ;/3/823;68777777777777777
*&-'$#=!"#:*&&+('*!&-'$F9#'&' .;;; Indiana ;23/6/3282777777777777777
:9#'&()I#9B('('>*&A":9#,B(9)@ .;;5 California ;2311;3156777777777777777
%&))=*&#+?&&@,*#&,, .;;< Utah ;63418324;777777777777777
,('*)"(#&()*&#+9F"',F())9 .;;1 Wyoming ;63105344;777777777777777
9#>&'('*F(*:,A-#> .;;6 Mississippi ;136113<<4777777777777777
?9,$9#'#9B('('>('*C>"))-+ .;;2 New Mexico ;<3;6<3;18777777777777777
9#>&'('*'9?9)) .;;/ West Virginia ;5321/3568777777777777777
"#*$(*,)&+9#9>(&'")*&#+'&#$%+&)9 .;;4 Alaska ;5316/361;777777777777777
#KLMNK.O7PO7QL7DPNRP.S758;;
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!"#$%"&'()*" !"#"&"%+"', -.+)/$.% '01/$*)/"2'3)%2)/"'
45)66.%17'
!"#$"%&%"'(&(&)(&*+,-../'("-0 1223 New Mexico 2456785634999999999999999
*.&.*.:;(--(:#:%<0;.",=> 1274 Alaska 35?@A5?8@99999999999999999
#=&B.=C<(&%"'(&(&)*.(&*,=D"%#'("-0 1272 California 35?@A5?8@99999999999999999
=)"%"'(&(&)E/=%D"$(&)(&*#=&=&$.&(. 1277 Texas @5@6658AA99999999999999999
!>./(&)%"'(&(&)*.&"!*=#$-" 1278 Wyoming @5@A854FA99999999999999999
*=-</"$-<,%(*=&$#*.*.$$.&G=--"> 127? Louisiana @5788586499999999999999999
,::-*:%<0;.",=> 127A Alaska @54@25A3899999999999999999
G"&$<%=%"'(&(&)=&0$%=&#/(##(.&--*$;./=# 1276 Oklahoma F5A@@58A499999999999999999
;<&$*.&#-0(&*#=&0"%#G(--" 127F Mississippi 653AA53@@99999999999999999
#(-G"%"=)-"%"'(&(&)(&*!..0#*%.## 127@ Utah 65?@25F2699999999999999999
=/"%(*=&%"'(&(&))%.<:(&*,%=0'.%0 1273 Pennsylvania 65878567A99999999999999999
*.&&=*;"%.(-E)=#-$0)%"=$'=--# 1284 Montana 65878567A99999999999999999
)%"D="&"%)>#=&$=/=%(= 1282 California 6544F5???99999999999999999
!.%-0.(-*.#.<$;)=$" 1287 California A58FA54@299999999999999999
*=-</"$-<,%(*=&$#*.:%(&*"$.& 1288 Louisiana A57?@564399999999999999999
/=%$(&%"#.<%*"/=&=)"/"&$)%:#/=*D.G"% 128? Arkansas ?5F?75F2399999999999999999
G=-"%."&"%)>*.%:!(-/(&)$.&=#:;=-$:-=&$ 128A California 853@85@@?99999999999999999
/(0#.<$;"&"%)>--*#./"%#"$ 1286 Kentucky 85?FF533?99999999999999999
)..0!=>%"'(&(&)--*=$/.%" 128F Alabama 75A3756@699999999999999999
)=%*."&"%)>--*0.<)-=# 128@ Wyoming 757F65A4A99999999999999999
#(-G"%"=)-"%"'(&(&)(&*"G=&#$.& 1283 Wyoming 25@3F54@@99999999999999999
.(-;.-0(&)(&*.H&=%0 12?4 California 25FF4562A99999999999999999
'.%"-=&0%"'(&(&)*.%:"-> 12?2 Nevada 2576?5F7A99999999999999999
%IJKLI1M9NM9OJ9BNLPN1Q97422
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Table 6 – Ethanol producers’ names, locations and capacities 
 
 
!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8(
9:$''&%;<
!"#$%&'()*+%'*,!-./0..1 23 Aberdeen, SD 44566656667777777
##1./89!0*:;5<<= 2> Adams, NE 3365666566677777
?*@./%A.1.B*-@.C&.@; 2D Albert City, IA EF566656667777777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,L@.1MJ@@. 2N Albert Lea, MN 3665666566677777
I(.!10./;%1;!@-J%1#'(*1%@<<= 24 Albion, MI 3365666566677777
?*@./%A.1.B*-@.C&.@; 2E Albion, NE EF566656667777777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,!@.O*10/J* 2P Alexandria, IN NN566656667777777
G*'/J%'A.1.B*-@.C&.@;5<<= 2F Annawan, IL 46566656667777777
G@*'J1&:#'(*1%@5<<=Q 2R Arthur, IA D56665666777777777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,!;('%1 236 Ashton, IA >NN5666566677777
S#)!T#'(*1%@ 233 Atkinson, NE ,77777777777777777777
"&;(:J@@;#'(*1%@5U1VWQ 23> Atwater, MN 3>65666566677777
X.//JV+*10=%:2*19 23D Aurora, CO N6656667777777777777
!M.1'J1.A.1.B*-@.#1./895<<= 23N Aurora, NE N4566656667777777
!M.1'J1.A.1.B*-@.#1./895<<= 234 Aurora, NE N4566656667777777
?*@./%A.1.B*-@.C&.@; 23E Aurora, SD EF566656667777777
YJ10L*2C*/:; 23P Baconton, GA D4566656667777777
=(J22.B*?*@@.9#'(*1%@=%WQ 23F Benson, MN F4566656667777777
!8#1./89A.;%&/V.;5U1VW 23R Benton, IL 3365666566677777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,"J8$'%1. 2>6 Big Stone City, SD 3>65666566677777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,"J18(*:<*+. 2>3 Bingham Lake, MN N6566656667777777
=*/8J@@5U1VW 2>> Blair, NE N6566656667777777
?*@./%A.1.B*-@.C&.@; 2>D Bloomingburg, OH EF566656667777777
L/..1G@*J1;A.1.B*-@.#1./89 2>N Bluffton, IN 3F566656667777777
G*VJKJV#'(*1%@ 2>4 Boardman, OR 46566656667777777
Y.;'./1YJ;V%1;J1A.1.B*-@.#1./895<<=Q 2>E Boyceville, WI N56665666777777777
"/J08.2%/'#'(*1%@ 2>P Bridgeport, NE N6566656667777777
XJ11.;%'*#1./89Q 2>F Buffalo Lake, MN N4566656667777777
G*VJKJV#'(*1%@ 2>R Burley, ID 46566656667777777
U0*(%#'(*1%@G/%V.;;J18 2D6 Caldwell, ID N4566656667777777
)J0J%1#'(*1%@ 2D3 Cambria, WI ,77777777777777777777
S.-/*;+*=%/1G/%V.;;J185<<= 2D> Cambridge, NE 4D566656667777777
$%&'(B.;'L.%/8J*#'(*1%@5<<= 2DD Camilla, GA 44566656667777777
Y.;'./1G@*J1;#1./895<<=Q 2DN Campus, KS 3365666566677777
!M.1'J1.A.1.B*-@.#1./895<<= 2D4 Canton, IL N4566656667777777
GH#I"J%/.KJ1J18,=*/% 2DE Caro, MI N4566656667777777
$(%BX.#'(*1%@ 2DP Carrollton, MO 3665666566677777
I(*/*@0;%1#'(*1%@ 2DF Casselton, ND 3365666566677777
!/V(./)*1J.@;XJ0@*10 2DR Cedar Rapids, IA 3365666566677777
#'(*1%@7G/%0&V./;7*;7%K7!2/J@7>633
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!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8
!"#$%&'!&%'()*+ ,-. Cedar Rapids, IA -/0...0...1111111
2&""#!345#+6"#"7483"9#"&:; ,-< Central City, NE <=0...0...1111111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:ABC4#)"33%& ,-/ Chancellor, SD <<.0...0...11111
D43"&%6"#"7483"E("3+ ,-F Charles City, IA G=0...0...1111111
H3AB%&#B3"4#E("3I ,-- Claremont, MN J/0...0...1111111
B4+)4'"2&45# ,-K Clatskanie, OR <<.0...0...11111
@5%#43B3"4&$5"3' ,-G Clearfield, PA A11111111111111111111
H&)C"&L4#5"3+M5'34#' ,-N Clinton, IA <<.0...0...11111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:AB3%O"&'43" ,-= Cloverdale, IN K-0...0...1111111
?C"H#'"&+%#+B3;P"&+9*C4#%30QQB ,-J Clymers, IN GK0...0...1111111
H&)C"&L4#5"3+M5'34#' ,K. Columbus, NE <<.0...0...11111
H8"#:%4@5%"#"&:;B%&,R ,K< Colwich, KS G.0...0...1111111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:AB%%#64,5'+ ,K/ Coon Rapids, IA <<.0...0...11111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:AB%&#5#: ,KF Corning, IA /.0...0...1111111
2%3'"#BC""+"B%P,4#;%$B435$%&#54I ,K- Corona, CA <0NK.0...0...1
H3*&4@5%$("3+B%+C%)*%#9*C4#%30QQB ,KK Coshocton, OH KK0...0...1111111
S%(*C7"+*T%746"#"7483"9#"&:;0QQBI ,KG Council Bluffs, IA <<.0...0...11111
2%3'"#?&54#:3"9#"&:;0QQBI ,KN Craig, MO FK0...0...1111111
H&)C"&L4#5"3+M5'34#' ,K= Decatur, IL <<.0...0...11111
HP45U5#:9#"&:;0QQBI ,KJ Denison, IA <<.0...0...11111
@5:65O"&V#5*"'9#"&:; ,G. Dyersville, IA <<K0...0...11111
B4&:5330T#)R ,G< Eddyville, IA -.0...0...1111111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:A9PP"*+8(&: ,G/ Emmetsburg, IA KN0K..0...1111111
E35#*W533+6"+%(&)"+Q! ,GF Fairbank, IA G=0...0...1111111
@5%E("39#"&:;A@($$43%Q4X"9#"&:;0QQB ,G- Fairmont, MN -J0...0...1111111
H@9E45&P%#* ,GK Fairmont, NE <<.0...0...11111
2&""#!345#+6"#"7483"9#"&:; ,GG Fergus Falls, MN <=0...0...1111111
!>9?@5%&"$5#5#:AE%+*%&54 ,GN Fostoria, OH <..0...0...11111
V#5*"'YT2&45#!&%'()"&+0QQBI ,G= Friesland, WI KK0...0...1111111
D43"&%6"#"7483"E("3+ ,GJ Ft. Dodge, IA G=0...0...1111111
Z(4'AB%(#*;B%&#!&%)"++%&+I ,N. Galva, IA FK0...0...1111111
@5:65O"&6"+%(&)"+243O40QQB ,N< Galva, IL <..0...0...11111
@%#4#U49#"&:;0QQB ,N/ Garden City, KS G.0...0...1111111
6""O"H:&5A9#"&:; ,NF Garden City, KS /.0...0...1111111
94+*[4#+4+H:&5A9#"&:;0QQBI ,N- Garnett, KS F<0K..0...1111111
>#"94&*C9#"&:; ,NK Gibson City, IL GJ0...0...1111111
B%&#0Q!I ,NG Goldfield, IA <.0...0...1111111
9B4&(+%\2%%'34#'9#"&:;B"#*"&] ,NN Goodland, KS <..0...0...11111
H3*&4@5%$("3+!C%"#5^@5%T#'(+*&5"+0QQB ,N= Goshen, CA K/0...0...1111111
9*C4#%31!&%'()"&+14+1%$1H,&531/.<<
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
 
!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-.'/(&) 012 Gowrie, IA 3345444544466666
789:);<=>?<<! 0@4 Grafton, ND A54445444666666666
<'B&CD()E*BCF';;'>&=&)C 0@3 Grand Junction, IA GA544454446666666
.(H+&=)IH88C#+)(,E5<<FJ 0@K Granite Falls, MN 3345444544466666
$:)7+>)(C'+CLH(H=:'+#=:H+'85<<F 0@A Greenville, OH GM544454446666666
DBNHE%&'*B)8C.())+/''> 0@O Greenwood, WI 3345444544466666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-.('='+ 0@G Groton, SD GK544454446666666
PH+Q&+C'+R)+)/HN8)#+)(,E5<<F 0@M Hankinson, ND MK544454446666666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-PH+8'+='/+ 0@1 Hanlontown, IA 3445444544466666
SH8)('R)+)/HN8)IB)8C 0@@ Hartley, IA M@544454446666666
7.!J 0@2 Hastings, NE 3445444544466666
F:&)*#=:H+'8 024 Hastings, NE G4544454446666666
LH(TB&C#+)(,E5<<F 023 Hennepin, IL MG544454446666666
LB(0:E"&8 02K Hereford, TX AA544454446666666
U:&=)#+)(,E 02A Hereford, TX GM544454446666666
P)('+<HQ)%&'#+)(,E5<<F 02O Heron Lake, MN -66666666666666666666
700';H=='V%&'#+)(,E 02G Hopewell, VA 24544454446666666
F';;'+/)H8=:7,(&-#+)(,E5<<FJ 02M Hopkinsville, KY G4544454446666666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-PB>C'+ 021 Hudson, SD 3345444544466666
7%#W'B=:DHQ'=H-PB('+ 02@ Huron, SD 3A45444544466666
I8&+=P&88CR)C'B(9)C<! 022 Iowa Falls, IA M@544454446666666
W&'BV8H+>#=:H+'85<<F 0344 Jackson, NE M2544454446666666
.BH(>&H+#+)(,E 0343 Janesville, MN O4544454446666666
SH8)('R)+)/HN8)IB)8C 034K Jefferson Junction, WI M@544454446666666
%!%&'*B)8CX'(=:7;)(&9H 034A Jennings, LA G4544454446666666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-Y)/)88 034O Jewell, IA GM544454446666666
<&*)8&+)I''>C5<<F 034G Joseph, MO G4544454446666666
7#%&'*B)8C 034M Keyes, CA 3445444544466666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-<H>>'+&H 0341 Laddonia, MO GG544454446666666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-<HQ)F(EC=H8 034@ Lake Crystal, MN M@544454446666666
FH(N'+.())+%&')+)(,E 0342 Lake Odessa, MI O4544454446666666
.())+!8H&+CR)+)/HN8)#+)(,E 0334 Lakota, IA 3@544454446666666
P&,:/H=)(#=:H+'8<<F 0333 Lamberton, MN O4544454446666666
!"#$%&'()*&+&+,-<)&0C&9 033K Leipsic, OH O4544454446666666
7>Q&+C#+)(,E5<<FJ 033A Lena, IL 3345444544466666
#W#789':'8Z+9? 033O Leoti, KS GO544454446666666
<)[)88H+>\P'9Q8)EF'B+=E#=:H+'85<<F 033G Levelland, TX K35G4454446666666
F'(+:BCQ)(#+)(,E<)V&+,='+5<<F 033M Lexington, NE 34G5444544466666
7(QH8'+#+)(,E5<<F 0331 Liberal, KS G5O445444666666666
.()H=)(":&'#=:H+'85<<F 033@ Lima, OH K3544454446666666
#=:H+'86!('>B9)(C6HC6'*670(&86K433
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!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8
!"#$%&'()*$+&#,'!,,- -../ Little Falls, MN 00122212223333333
4&$"567'" -.82 Loudon, TN 9:122212223333333
;&%&''"';%,<=>$? -.8. Louisville, KY 92122212223333333
@"A, -.88 Luverne, MN B33333333333333333333
C&#?&?*$+&#,'166! -.8D Lyons, KS 99122212223333333
;E*4FG,%"HG#G#IB(&>,# -.89 Macon, MO 02122212223333333
;&>GHG>*$+&#,' -.80 Madera, CA 02122212223333333
JK"#I,&FG,"#"%I7!,%-L -.8: Madison, IL :2122212223333333
(G<JM"%G>&JI%G;%,<=>$?NO+"&$'&#< -.8P Madrid, NE 92122212223333333
(G<B(G??,=%G*#"%I71Q#>LR -.8S Malta Bend, MO :S122212223333333
6G$$'"TG,=U!,%#;%,>"??,%?16;R -.8/ Marcus, IA ..21222122233333
;G#&'*#"%I7166! -.D2 Maricopa, AZ B33333333333333333333
!"#$%&'Q#<G&#&*$+&#,'166! -.D. Marion, IN 02122212223333333
;E*4FG,%"HG#G#IB(&%G,# -.D8 Marion, OH ..01222122233333
)=@"#*#"%I7 -.DD Marion, SD 80122212223333333
J%>+"%V&#G"'?(G<'&#< -.D9 Marshall, MN ..21222122233333
(&%7?AG''"*$+&#,'166! -.D0 Marysville, MI ..21222122233333
@,'<"#@%&G#*#"%I7166!R -.D: Mason City, IA 02122212223333333
T-">$%=MF=?G#"??W"#$=%"?Q#>L -.DP Mead, NE 08122212223333333
6&#<EX6&Y"?R -.DS Melrose, MN .2P1222122233333
Z'G#$[G''?\"?,=%>"?6; -.D/ Menlo, IA :S122212223333333
;'7M,=$+*$+&#,'166!R -.92 Merrill, IA :S122212223333333
]#G$"<*$+&#,' -.9. Milton, WI 9S122212223333333
@'&>G&'6&Y"?*#"%I7166!B(G#& -.98 Mina, SD 89122212223333333
CJJ;J*$+&#,'166!R -.9D Minden, NE B33333333333333333333
;E*4FG,%"HG#G#IB(G$>+"'' -.99 Mitchell, SD B33333333333333333333
F&<I"%T$&$"*$+&#,'166!R -.90 Monroe, WI 82122212223333333
V*)!EQQ -.9: Morris, MN 02122212223333333
JA"#$G#"\"#"^&K'"*#"%I7166! -.9P Mount Vernon, IN 90122212223333333
JK"#I,&FG,"#"%I7!,%-L -.9S Mt. Vernon, IN :2122212223333333
@%&G#;%,>"??G#I!,%-L -.9/ Muscatine, IA 90122212223333333
!&?$'"\,>Y\"#"^&K'"Z="'?166! -.02 Necedah, WI ..21222122233333
6G#>,'#^&7*#"%I7166!R -.0. Nevada, IA :S122212223333333
[,M"'&#<*#"%I7 -.08 New Hampton, IA .821222122233333
6,=G?V%"7H=?!,MM,<G$G"? -.0D Norfolk, NE 0D122212223333333
W&'"%,\"#"^&K'"Z="'? -.09 North Linden, IN :S122212223333333
;E*4FG,%"HG#G#IB),%$+(&#>+"?$"% -.00 North Manchester, IN 9S122212223333333
@%""#;'&G#?\"#"^&K'"*#"%I7 -.0: Obion, TN .S122212223333333
@%""#;'&G#?\"#"^&K'"*#"%I7 -.0P Ord, NE .S122212223333333
]$G>&*#"%I7166! -.0S Oshkosh, WI 92122212223333333
*$+&#,'3;%,<=>"%?3&?3,H3J-%G'382..
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!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8
!"#$%&#&'#()*+",-#.+*/0!!12 3456 Palestine, IL 78088808889999999
):.#;"#.<.#.='>&.-#.+*/0!!1 3478 Pekin, IL ?5088808889999999
)+$@.+A'#".&BC"(&'#( 3474 Peoria, IL 4480888088899999
D+'"+".E%+"F%#)*+",-#.+*/0!!1 347G Phillipsburg, KS ,99999999999999999999
1'&*+.#<.#.='>&.HI.&B0!!1 347J Pixley, CA 7K088808889999999
EIBL.+)*0!!12 347? Plainview, NE 55088808889999999
M@";.-#.+*/ 3475 Plainview, TX 57088808889999999
)>.#*%'N"%.#.+*/1%+3O 3477 Portales, NM 78088808889999999
DP-QN"%+.R"#"#*,D%+;&'#( 347S Portland, IN ,99999999999999999999
T';.='/-;@'#%& 347K Pratt, KS ,99999999999999999999
DP-QN"%+.R"#"#*,D+.B;%# 3476 Preston, MN 58088808889999999
1&.'#NI+#HI.&B0!!1 34S8 Raeford, NC ?8088808889999999
D'+'&&.&D+%(I$;B 34S4 Rancho Cucamonga, CA ?8088808889999999
)>.#*%'N"%.#.+*/1%+3O 34SG Ravenna, NE 78088808889999999
<.(R".&(-#.+*/0!!12 34SJ Redfield, SD ,99999999999999999999
U+%VI%"BN"%,-#.+*/1%W3'#/0!!1 34S? Rensselaer, IN 4880888088899999
<.(Q+'"&-#.+*/0!!1 34S5 Richardton, ND G8088808889999999
T+..#D&'"#B<.#.='>&.-#.+*/ 34S7 Riga, MI 4K088808889999999
)>.#*%'N"%.#.+*/1%+3O 34SS Road O York, NE 78088808889999999
U&&"#%"B<":.+-#.+*/0!!1 34SK Rochelle, IL 48088808889999999
X%+;@1%I#;+/-;@'#%&0!!12 34S6 Rosholt, SD 44088808889999999
M@";.-#.+*/ 34K8 Russell, KS 57088808889999999
1.#;.+-;@'#%&1%W3'#/ 34K4 Sauget, IL 4480888088899999
X.B"L'-#.+*/0!!1 34KG Scandia, KS 75088808889999999
DP-QN"%+.R"#"#*,Y$%;&'#( 34KJ Scotland, SD 78088808889999999
M.B;.+#X.=Z%+L-#.+*/!!1 34K? Shelby, NY 48088808889999999
H&"#;E"&&B<.B%I+$.B!D 34K5 Shell Rock, IA 7K088808889999999
T+..#D&'"#B<.#.='>&.-#.+*/ 34K7 Shenandoah, IA 4K088808889999999
Y"%I[&'#(-#.+*/\!":.B;%$L1%%32 34KS Sioux Center, IA ?4088808889999999
<'#*.HI.&B 34KK Soperton, GA J4088808889999999
X.=-#.+*/1%+3O 34K6 South Bend, IN ?G088808889999999
)>B%&I;.-#.+*/0!!12 3468 St. Ansgar, IA 78088808889999999
)1--;@'#%&0!!1 3464 Stanley, WI 78088808889999999
D"#.!'L.1%+#D+%$.BB%+B0!!1 346G Steamboat Rock, IA G5088808889999999
Y;.+&"#*-;@'#%&0!!1 346J Sterling, CO 508880888999999999
D'$"R"$-;@'#%& 346? Stockton, CA 58088808889999999
T+..#D&'"#B<.#.='>&.-#.+*/ 3465 Superior, IA 4K088808889999999
C"(=.B;<.#.='>&.-#.+*/0!!1 3467 Sutherland, NE 4880888088899999
<.#%:'-#.+*/ 346S Torrington, WY 405880888999999999
Q+.#;%#)*+"D+%(I$;B0!!1D+%(I$;B 346K Trenton, NE 5?088808889999999
-;@'#%&9D+%(I$.+B9'B9%R9)3+"&9G844
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!"#$%&'()*&+,-.*(/$0. 1.2.*.%-.(3 4&-$"5&% 6$7$-5"8
!"#$%"&'()(*+'," -.// Underwood, ND ..01222122233333
4+56&'+")(*+'," -722 Union City, IN 833333333333333333333
9:;5,<$==>$=&?'@5,#- -72. Upton, WY .221222122233333
!#'?$8)5?,'A&<B=C#5? -727 Vicksburg, MS ..21222122233333
D#',<, -72E Volney, NY F2122212223333333
G5<*$5>+'&$"=H&6"+'6 -720 Wallhalla, ND ..21222122233333
@"+<&+":+B$=)'$5?I1::4J -72F Watertown, SD 70122212223333333
A+"$5,K$'$L+C"$%#$"= -72M Welcome, MN MN122212223333333
>+B,(+)(*+',"1::4J -72O Wentworth, SD .221222122233333
!&?K&P$5K$=,#5<$=1::4J -72N West Burlington, IA ..F1222122233333
%5,'(K+'?$)'$5?I1::4 -72/ Windsor, CO 02122212223333333
4,5';"#=1::;J -7.2 Winnebago, MN 833333333333333333333
Q$+5("+'64,5';5,6#<(=J -7.. Winthrop, MN 833333333333333333333
!&,%#$")'$5?I8;&,'$$5R5+&")'$5?I1::4 -7.7 Wood River, NE 833333333333333333333
S#T+)(*+'," -7.E Yuma, CO 833333333333333333333
)(*+',"3;5,6#<$5=3+=3,U3G-5&"372..
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Table 7 – Total gains and losses at different values of B 
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#$%&'%()*+,)-('./+
01$2+345,+67888+
9,:;
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?@3('/+62(**($'+
.)**$'/;
<2$='%+!*&'>&>+
?(%A$=%+345,+
62(**($'+.)**$'/;
+#$%&'%()*+,)-('./+
01$2+345,+67888+9,:;+
B/C+!*&'>('.+D)1.('+
E88 !"#$"%&$"#'((((((((((( !)$)*!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !"#$"%+((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
F8 !"#$,)+$','((((((((((( !)$)*!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !"#$,)+((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
G8 !"#$,&%$#)#((((((((((( !)$)*!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !"#$,&%((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
EH !*,$'*!$,)'((((((((((( !)$)*!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !*,$'*%((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
EI !*,$'),$&+)((((((((((( !)$)*!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !*,$')"((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
EJ !&!$+!+$#*,((((((((((( !#$"&"((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !&!$+!+((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
EK !"#$"#,$%++((((((((((( !!$&"&((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( !"#$"#,((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
E8 %&#$,,+$!%*((((((((((( !'$,&!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)*!(((((((((((((((((((((((( %&#$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
L %""$*+"$,)"((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$)'&(((((((((((((((((((((((( %""$*,'((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
H ###$&#&$,!'((((((((((( !'$,&!((((((((((((((((((((((((( !)$'&#(((((((((((((((((((((((( ###$&#+((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
M #&#$*!&$'%,((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !#$+!,(((((((((((((((((((((((( #&#$*!&((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
F )!'$"%"$##"((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !%$+)&(((((((((((((((((((((((( )!'$"%"((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
K )))$'!)$+)*((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !!$%*"(((((((((((((((((((((((( )))$'!*((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
8 ))*$&*'$%,)((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !'$,+'(((((((((((((((((((((((( ))*$&*'((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
NK ))*$+''$!#)((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !'$,+'(((((((((((((((((((((((( ))*$+''((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
NF ))*$&*+$&%%((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !'$,+'(((((((((((((((((((((((( ))*$&*,((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
NE8 ))*$+'&$%**((((((((((( !'$,,+((((((((((((((((((((((((( !'$,+'(((((((((((((((((((((((( ))*$+'&((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
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Table 8 - % Gains and losses per State at different values of B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!"#$ %&&'&& (&'&& )&'&& %*'&& %+'&& %,'&& %-'&& %&'&& .'&& *'&& /'&& ('&& -'&& &'&& 0-'&& 0('&& 0%&'&&
!"#$#%# &''( &')( &)*( &+,( &+,( &+-( .&*( +.,( '-&( /&&( .,.*( 0,)( ..'( &)0( &.0( ,-( -&(
!"#12# *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *( *(
!32#41#1 &'-( &)+( &/*( &-'( &/&( &,'( ,+( '&'( --'( &++,( )-+( .,'( &-&( &&,( ,.( 0/( '/(
5#"678346# 9-)( 9-.( 9',( 9..( &-( .+.( .,*( &&'( /)( 0/( )0( '*( .,( .'( .&( &-( &'(
58"83#:8 .( '( &.( &*( &.( &/( .'( ')( 0-( /0( .**( ''.( +-.,,)( 00&( ++&( &/,( &&*(
;<83=6# &'*( &+/( &+&( &.&( &&/( &&'( &*/( &.-( &'-( &-&( .*)( +'*( &.)+( +,*( .+&( &'+( //(
>#?#66 9&*.( 9&*-( ,'( &**( &**( &**( &**( ,'( ,*( /-( /'( -,( -.( 0/( 0'( 0*( )+(
@""64861 *( *( &( 9.( 9+( 9&( &( &.( ..( +0( ).( &&*( &0,'( &***( '.*( ..'( &.0(
@4:6#4# *( 9&( 9.( 90( 9-( 9-( &( &/( +*( '-( 0)( &),( &,&-( ,&)( +-'( &,/( &&&(
A#41#1 *( *( *( 9'( 9)( 9.( /( +*( '+( 0&( ,0( +',( &**'( +/0( .+-( &)*( ,+(
A<4BCD2E *( *( 9&( 9)( 90( 9'( *( &'( .0( -'( &//( +0.( .*00( ,.0( +-/( .**( &&.(
F8C616#4# '-( '0( +)( .0( &,( +( 9.+( 9&.0( 9&-)( 9)/( 9+-( 9..( 9&-( 9&+( 9&&( 9/( 90(
G6DH6=#4 9&( 9&( 9'( 9,( 9&&( 9,( +( 0&( /0( +-( '-( .,+( &--'( /,'( +)-( &//( &*)(
G644<18B# &( .( 0( +( +( &*( .'( )'( /0( &&.( &)&( '/,'( 0-0( +&'( .*/( &+/( //(
G6116116II6 &+/( &++( &&+( ,-( /,( --( 0*( -&( ,.( &.)( &,)( .-..( &.&( -+( )+( +-( .)(
G84B#4# ./( .,( +&( .)( .)( +'( +&( -*( &'*( 0))( )++0( +,)( &)&( &*-( /+( 0.( ''(
J<K#:# &)/( &--( .00( .--( +&.( +.)( '.'( ,**( ..-&( ''/+( &&./( ').( ..)( &-)( &'+( &&.( /+(
J<?LM<31<E &/( &/( &)( &+( &.( /( 9&.( 9.0( 9++( 9'0( 900( 9'''( 90,( 9+/( 9.0( 9&/( 9&.(
J<?LG<N6D8 &''( &'0( &)+( &''( &')( &')( &'+( &--( .*,( .)/( ++0( -).( /-+( +)/( ..)( &''( ,&(
J83BHLO#28B# .( '( &*( /( ,( &&( &,( '&( 0&( ,*( &+-( '/&( /*)( +//( .))( &0,( &*/(
PH68 &*( ,( ,( )( '( '( 0( .*( +&( ')( 0&( &.&( //)( &-/0( )*.( .'.( &+*(
P2"#H8%# &*( &*( -( .( &( +( .'( '-( -'( &'-( .0-( &/&.&( )&,( +*&( .&*( &''( ,)(
Q<441E"K#46# &)( &)( &'( &.( &&( 9.( 9&+( 9+-( 9'-( 90.( 9,/( 9)&)( 9')( 9.-( 9.*( 9&'( 9&*(
R<44<11<< &''( &'0( &).( &'.( &'.( &'.( &'.( &/+( ..'( ./)( +,&( &))0( '',( .'.( &0)( &&.( -+(
R<N#1 9+.( 9+&( 9.+( 9&-( 9&&( 90( &-( 00/( 0)( ++( .+( /( .( *( *( *( *(
SB#H &',( &)/( .*&( &,,( .&0( .'0( ')+( &/-*( .+-,( ,/'( 0+.( +&-( &/-( &+,( &&*( /'( 0&(
T63=646# &'-( &)&( &0-( &0&( &0'( &0/( &-+( .&-( .)-( +&&( +,0( /00( &&*-( '+,( .-'( &-)( &*,(
U#1H64=B84 9)-( 9)*( &0( /.( +*0( -&'( .+'( &'*( &&)( ,-( /'( 00( '/( '&( +0( +*( .'(
U<1BLT63=646# &'.( &'.( &'*( &+&( &.,( &+'( &+.( &+/( &0*( &/-( ..)( +/.( .&-0( )*'( .0'( &)'( ,&(
U61D84164 *( *( *( 9'( 9'( *( )( &/( .,( +)( )&( &&0( &'/,( ,&+( '**( .&-( &.+(
UE8%64= +( )( &'( &&( &+( &/( .'( 0.( &*/( ..'( '*+( &+*)( +*/( &/0( &++( ,+( 0.(
12$3453678"9653:7!
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Table 9 – Km-gallons with and without RINs and savings from RINs 
 
 
Figure 10 – Equilibrium price of RINs for various values of B 
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